UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/828
27 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I should like to inform you of another series of terrorist attacks conducted in the past two days by the Bosnian Serbs against civilian targets on the territory of Croatia.

On 25 September, at 1420 hours, 1 howitzer shell exploded at Rajevo Selo, causing electrical grid failure; from 1940 to 2010 hours, 15 howitzer shells landed on Jasenovac; at 2340 hours, one projectile landed on Ivanic-Grad; at 2345 hours, one mortar round landed on Hrvatska/Kostajnica. On 26 September, at 0107 hours, one Orkan missile exploded at the municipal cemetery in the town of Novska, causing considerable damage; at 0512 hours, one missile with an aerosol warhead impacted at the town of Kutina and exploded in the vicinity of a chemical plant in Kutina, causing serious damage; at 0815 hours, one Orkan missile with a cluster-bomb warhead exploded in the centre of the town of Pozega, wounding nine civilians, three very seriously.

Unprovoked attacks on strictly civilian targets constitute a violation of the laws of war, and their perpetrators have to be brought to justice. This violation was exacerbated by the employment of internationally forbidden munitions.

The attack on the Kutina chemical plant raises very serious concerns, owing to the possible consequences of such an attack. Yesterday's missile deviated from its target by only 1,000 metres; the explosion of the aerosol warhead occurred at the level of 150 metres over the town, causing destruction and severe damage to over 20 per cent of the town's windows and roofs. The missile employed was a modified Soviet-built SA-2 Dvina guided AA missile (marked SDU48B in Cyrillic lettering on the tail), most probably with a proximity trigger.

At the time of the attack, as well as during all the previous five attacks - most recently on 8 and 18 September, in which Orkan and Luna missiles were employed - the meteorological situation with stable atmospheric pressure and wind direction allowed for maximum civilian casualties in the town of Kutina. Had any of these attacks impacted the Kutina chemical plant directly, the town would have suffered thousands of casualties.

Enclosed please find a study* on the possible ecological consequences of a successful attack on the Kutina chemical plant, resulting in partial or complete destruction of some or all of the facilities employing toxic chemicals. The study is based on the previous five attacks on the plant.

The conclusions of the study indicate that even a partial destruction of some of the plant's production or storage facilities would result in a most severe ecological disaster and would cause tens of thousands of casualties in the towns of Kutina, Sisak, Ivanic-Grad, Velika Gorica, Zagreb and elsewhere, while the toxic cloud would reach across the borders of the Republic of Croatia, over 200 kilometres from Kutina into Slovenia, Austria and Hungary.

Croatia remains committed to the peace process and would not undertake any action that would undermine its successful conclusion in this delicate and very important phase. However, the Bosnian Serb irregular forces continue to use every opportunity of favourable atmospheric conditions in the past three weeks to make attempts to destroy the Kutina Plant. Should those attacks continue, in order to ensure the safety of its civilian population and the environment, the Republic of Croatia shall be obliged to use all the necessary measures to neutralize the offending launching positions.

I would kindly request your assistance in circulating the present letter and its annex* as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ambassador Dr. Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative

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* The study may be consulted at the Secretariat, room S-3520.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1995/829
28 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Yesterday, at 1416 local time, Pale Serb forces fired an Orkan type rocket with cluster bombs at the city centre of Travnik. Two civilians were killed and more than 20 were wounded. On 22 September 1995, Bosnian Serbs fired similar rockets at Zenica, causing one casualty and serious material damage.

These attacks have come despite the peace efforts currently under way. They also indicate a new tactic in the practice of the Serb aggressors, who have now resumed attacks against the towns outside a "safe area" designation, thus not fearing retribution.

The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina requests the Security Council to undertake all necessary measures to halt these acts of aggression and terrorism by the Pale Serbs.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ivan Z. MISIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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S/1995/830
28 September 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the violations of Iraqi national airspace committed by United States aircraft in order to carry out reconnaissance and cause provocation continued over the period 11-20 September 1995.

11 September 1995

1. Northern region: 21 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Mosul, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Ayn Zalah and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 69 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Shatrah, Jalibah and Artawi.

3. At 0855 hours on 11 September 1995, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. It left in the direction of Kuwait at 1020 hours.

12 September 1995

1. Northern region: 15 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Zakho, Dohuk, Mosul, Irbil, Aqrah, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 104 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Basra, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih, Nasiriyah, Chabaish, Salman and Busayyah.

13 September 1995

1. Northern region: 12 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Aqrah and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 85 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Basra, Amarah and Salman.

3. At 1125 hours on 13 September 1995, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. It left in the direction of Kuwait at 1247 hours.

14 September 1995

1. Northern region: 20 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Ayn Zalah and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 67 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Jalibah and Artawi.

3. At 1000 hours on 14 September 1995, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region. It left in the direction of Kuwait at 1200 hours.

15 September 1995

1. Northern region: 11 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Dohuk, Mosul, Ayn Zalah, Amadiyah and Zakho.

2. Southern region: 69 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Basra, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman and Shatrah.

3. On 15 September 1995, two United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region, as follows:

The first flight entered Iraqi airspace at 0940 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1010 hours.

The second flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1150 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1305 hours.

16 September 1995

1. Northern region: 6 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Zakho, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Irbil, Mosul, Aqrah and Tall Afar.

2. Southern region: 34 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Samawah, Nasiriyah, Shanafiyah, Chabaish, Qurnah, Qal'at Salih and Jalibah.

3. On 16 September 1995, two United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region, as follows:

The first flight entered Iraqi airspace at 0955 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1150 hours.

The second flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1320 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1020 hours.

17 September 1995

1. Southern region: 94 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Chabaish, Shu'aybah, Busayyah and Artawi.

2. On 17 September 1995, three United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region, as follows:

The first flight entered Iraqi airspace at 0912 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1022 hours.

The second flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1015 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1210 hours.

The third flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1200 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1320 hours.

18 September 1995

1. Northern region: 22 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Tall Afar and Ayn Zalah.

2. Southern region: 68 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Jalibah, Artawi and Busayyah.

3. On 18 September 1995, two United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region, as follows:

The first flight entered Iraqi airspace at 0952 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1038 hours.

The second flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1215 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1320 hours.

19 September 1995

1. Northern region: 15 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Mosul, Tall Afar, Dohuk, Zakho, Amadiyah and Ayn Zalah.

2. Southern region: 65 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Artawi, Chabaish, Salman, Lasaf, Busayyah and Jalibah.

3. On 19 September 1995, two United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace in the southern region, as follows:

The first flight entered Iraqi airspace at 0900 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1000 hours.

The second flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1033 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1245 hours.

20 September 1995

1. Northern region: 13 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho and Aqrah.

2. Southern region: 71 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes, over Amarah, Samawah, Chabaish, Artawi and Jalibah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1995/831
29 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions of my Government, I am writing to you concerning the letter of the Croatian Foreign Minister addressed to you on 20 September 1995 (S/1995/812) and wish to state the following.

1. By that letter, Mr. Granić publicly acknowledged that the Croatian regular army has been actively engaged in the military operations within (the internationally recognized borders of) Bosnia and Herzegovina. In an attempt to justify the presence of the Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina by a bilateral agreement with the Bosnian Muslim leadership, Mr. Granić derogates the validity of the Security Council resolutions, particularly resolution 752 (1992), which contains an explicit demand that all troops from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina be withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since no unilateral act or bilateral agreement can derogate the resolutions of the Security Council, which under the Charter of the United Nations has the primary responsibility for maintenance of peace and security, the Yugoslav Government demands from the Security Council to be informed if it considers the above resolution still valid. Consequently, the Security Council has the obligation to undertake effective measures to ensure Croatia's compliance with the provisions set out in that resolution. By further tolerating the violations of its own resolutions and punishing only one side in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council challenges its own credibility in the political resolution of the Bosnian crisis.

2. Massive military engagement of the Croatian army in Bosnia and Herzegovina can in no way mean "solution". It is not only in direct contravention of the Security Council resolutions, resolution 752 (1992) in particular, but also further aggravates the situation and significantly diminishes the prospects for a positive outcome of the ongoing peace process in Bosnia.

3. It is well known what the real reasons are that the Serbs in Krajina have resorted to self-defence. The resistance of the Serb people towards the new Croatian State, as a continuation of the notorious "Independent State of Croatia" in which the Serb people were subjected to genocide, is an authentic expression of their legitimate rights and demands which were denied only to the Serb people. Furthermore, the decision that the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)

should undertake measures against the rebellious Republic of Croatia, which was determined to secede illegally and unconstitutionally, was made by the legitimate authorities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in accordance with the right of any sovereign and independent State to take all necessary actions in order to preserve its territorial integrity. Consequently, it is outrageous that Mr. Granić has accused the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for "the occupation of the Vukovar region", since the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was only constituted a year after the authentic drive of the Serb people of the region to protect their legitimate rights.

4. Croatian massive military engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents a striking example of the foreign military intervention, in direct contravention of the Charter and the relevant Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, such unlawful behaviour is coupled with consistent denial of all rights of the Serb people just for being Serbs. Horrendous atrocities committed by the regular army of Croatia in Western Slavonia and Krajina which resulted in the slaughter of thousands of Serbs, the looting and burning of Serb houses and the expulsion of about 500,000 of them from their ancestral homes, have proved that the main Croatian political goal is to establish an ethnically pure State. Such a policy of genocide is well known in recent European history, but then it was universally condemned and its perpetrators were justly punished. Unfortunately, the Croatian leadership is pursuing the same policy today and is not only not punished but not even condemned.

A country that resorts to State terror against a people just for being of different national and religious background, contrary to international human rights instruments, does not have any right to raise the issue of sanctions against other States.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia expects the Security Council to overcome its previous shortcomings and to undertake resolute and urgent measures in line with its competencies in order to ensure full compliance with its resolutions by Croatia, for the sake of the peaceful and comprehensive resolution of the crisis in the territories of the former Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

UNITED
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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1995/832
29 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions of my Government, I am writing to inform you of the following.

On 25 September 1995, at 3.10 p.m., the Croatian Army launched two shells and, at 3.30 p.m., opened fire from a 20-millimetre anti-aircraft gun from the position of Cesmina Glava against the positions of the Army of Yugoslavia in the area of Prasna Rupa in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

There were no casualties and the Yugoslav side did not return fire.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia again warns the Security Council of the grave consequences that may arise from the repeated criminal acts of Croatia against the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and expects the Security Council to undertake urgent and adequate measures in order to prevent Croatia from further military actions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1995/833
29 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions of my Government, I am writing to inform you of the following.

According to the Reuters news agency, Croatian troops opened fire on the refugee convoy near the town of Bosanski Novi, killing 47 Serb civilians. Reuters TV filmed 18 corpses, including those of women and children, riddled with bullets. The victims were aged between 12 and 72. As stated by United Nations sources and reported by Reuters, regular troops of Croatia entered 50 kilometres into the territory of the Republic of Srpska and killed those refugees. The current Croat-Muslim offensive, in which 60,000 soldiers of the regular Croatian army have been engaged, has resulted in the expulsion of 150,000 Serbs from north-western and central Bosnia.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia reiterates that the latest tragic exodus of the Serbs, following the mass flight of Serbs from Krajina, constitutes an unprecedented act of genocide.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/834
4 October 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 4 OCTOBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you resolution 5506 (104/3) of 21 September 1995 concerning the coercive measures and threats by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France against the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its one hundred and fourth session, held in Cairo.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohamed A. AZWAI
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Resolution adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its one hundred and fourth regular session

Cairo, September 1995

Coercive measures and threats by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France against the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

The Council of the League of Arab States,

Recalling its previous resolutions on this subject, the most recent being resolution 5470 of 29 March 1995,

Expressing its grave concern at the human suffering and material damage caused to the Libyan people as a result of the coercive measures imposed on it under Security Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993),

Regretting the persistence of the three Western States in refusing to respond to the efforts and endeavours aimed at reaching a settlement on the basis of the principles of international law and international legality and within a framework of understanding and constructive dialogue,

Expressing its appreciation of the solidarity of the regional organizations, including the Organization of African Unity, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Group of 77, with the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in this crisis,

Decides

1. To reaffirm its previous resolutions concerning solidarity with the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and to support the efforts of that country aimed at arriving at a peaceful solution to the crisis;

2. To adhere to the practical proposal contained in resolution 5373 adopted by the Council of the League on 27 March 1994, to the effect that the two suspects should be given a fair trial by the Scottish judges, in conformity with Scots law, at the seat of the International Court of Justice at The Hague;

3. To express its regret with regard to the continuation of the sanctions imposed on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, despite the various efforts and initiatives of the regional and international organizations aimed at finding a peaceful solution to the crisis;

4. To invite the Arab Commission of Seven to redouble its efforts and to communicate with the parties with a view to reaching a peaceful and just solution to the dispute;

5. To request the Secretary-General to monitor the implementation of the present resolution.

Resolution 5506 (104/3) of 21 September 1995.

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GENERAL

S/1995/835
29 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1009 (1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraphs 33 and 34 of my report (S/1995/730) on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1009 (1995), I noted that I had instructed my Special Representative to discuss with the Croatian Government and the local Serb leadership what tasks, if any, it would be useful for UNCRO to continue to perform in Sector East and elsewhere in Croatia under the current mandate. The present report is the result of those discussions.

2. My Special Representative has carried out consultations on UNCRO's tasks and held meetings with representatives of the Croatian Government, with Serb leaders in Belgrade and with the local Serb authorities in Sector East.

II. CONSIDERATIONS

3. As a result of the radically changed situation in Croatia, my Special Representative has identified the requirement to satisfy three very different demands.

4. First, there is a need to continue with the present tasks of the United Nations in Sector East and to facilitate the development of a peaceful solution. A continued United Nations presence in this area has been requested by both the Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in Sector East. It has been made clear in negotiations with both parties that a new spirit of cooperation is indispensable if the United Nations is to continue to expend its limited resources in the area. Particular emphasis has been placed upon the concerns of the troop-contributing countries following recent events in Croatia. During discussions, both parties have strongly indicated their willingness to cooperate and undertake negotiations towards a peaceful solution.

5. Secondly, in the course of the Croatian Army's recapture of Sectors North and South, more than 90 per cent of their Serb inhabitants fled from those areas. Though it was hoped that some of the Serb refugees would return to their homes, the continuing reports of human rights abuses and of the looting and burning of houses have created a climate which is not conducive to such a

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development. Indeed, many Serbs from among those who initially chose to remain are now departing or seeking to depart owing to the hostile environment in which they are at present obliged to live. The Croatian Government needs to reinforce its efforts to create the necessary conditions for Serbs to return to these areas and to encourage the residual Serb population to remain. The international community could assist the Croatian Government in creating an environment conducive to the return of all those persons who wish to return; UNCRO could play a valuable role in this regard, in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights with respect to human rights activities.

6. Thirdly, the Government of Croatia has requested that the United Nations monitor its border with both the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Areas of concern include Prevlaka and those areas of Croatia, such as Dubrovnik, which are close to, or contiguous with, Bosnian Serb-controlled territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7. In all negotiations, it has been emphasized that, while the United Nations is willing to extend its good offices to both sides, it is up to the parties to commit themselves to a peaceful solution and to find the political will to achieve it.

8. In the course of extensive negotiation, my Special Representative has obtained the support of the Croatian Government and the local Serb authorities in Sector East for modification of the present UNCRO mandate along the lines set out below.

III. TASKS

9. The plan proposed by my Special Representative, following his discussions and deliberations, is based on six main tasks, most of which have been identified for UNCRO in paragraph 3 of resolution 981 (1995). They are:

(a) Performing fully the functions envisaged in the Cease-fire Agreement of 29 March 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in Sector East (S/1994/367);

(b) Facilitating the implementation of the sections of the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994 (S/1994/1375) which are relevant to Sector East and arranging local economic initiatives as appropriate;

(c) Facilitating the implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including the functions identified in paragraph 72 of my report of 22 March 1995 (S/1995/222), in particular the continuation of confidence-building and humanitarian tasks, such as assistance to refugees and displaced persons and the monitoring of the treatment of ethnic minorities;

(d) Assisting in controlling, by monitoring and reporting, the crossing of military personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons, over the international borders between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

(Serbia and Montenegro) at the border crossings in Sector East where UNCRO is deployed;

(e) Monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula in accordance with Security Council resolution 779 (1992);

(f) Observing and reporting on military incidents in the vicinity of the international border between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

IV. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

10. My Special Representative and the Theatre Force Commander at the United Nations Peace Forces headquarters have analysed the functions and responsibilities outlined in paragraph 9 (a) to (f) above. The Security Council has concurred in my proposal to withdraw UNCRO's infantry battalions, with the exception of Sector East (see S/1995/748). Accordingly, the withdrawal of the battalions from Sectors West, North and South has begun and will be completed expeditiously. By the end of September, the strength will have been reduced to 4,190, with further reductions to approximately 2,500 scheduled for October.

11. In the remaining period of the mandate, the tasks in Sector East can largely be accomplished by retaining the present numbers of infantry. Tasks in the rest of Croatia can be achieved within the existing United Nations military observers (UNMOs), civilian police and civilian personnel strength, although some redeployments will be necessary. It should be noted in this context that the border crossing points in Sector East will be maintained by the battalions deployed there, while other border monitoring actions will be executed by UNMOs who will mount mobile patrols.

V. OBSERVATIONS

12. After intensive consultations with both sides, my Special Representative has been assured by the parties that they are willing to resolve the issue of Sector East through negotiation. In addition, both sides have undertaken to improve their level of compliance with existing agreements, and with specific regard to cooperation with UNCRO.

13. The commander of the local Serb forces in Sector East and the commander of the Osijek Operational Zone have met nine times since 25 August 1995, most recently on 25 September, in a Joint Commission convened by the UNCRO Commander Sector East. The Joint Commission is pursuing a plan to stabilize the situation, which includes the withdrawal of troops and weapons from the zone of separation, the restoration of full freedom of movement to UNCRO and the return of seized UNCRO observation posts. Aspects of the plan have been fulfilled, although progress remains slow. Most important, the local Serb authorities in Sector East have stated that they will comply with all the requirements of resolution 981 (1995), including border monitoring. A return to the provisions of the Cease-fire Agreement and the Economic Agreement would not only provide stability but also facilitate negotiations.

14. The Croatian Government has stated that Serbs are welcome to live in Croatia and that those Serbs who fled following the recapture of Sectors West, North and South are welcome to return. However, UNCRO continues to receive from its Human Rights Action Teams well-documented reports of human rights abuses and destruction of property. The incidents described in those reports do nothing to restore confidence among the Serb minority. A continuing United Nations presence in Croatia will provide one means of monitoring human rights, thus helping to restore the confidence of those Serbs considering returning to, or remaining in, Croatia. In cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNCRO will therefore continue to deploy Human Rights Action Teams to monitor human rights and provide reassurance to those Serbs who wish to return; these tasks will be carried out in conjunction with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other relevant agencies. Additionally, United Nations involvement in Sector East will enable the international community to monitor the treatment of the minorities by the local Serb authorities. UNCRO, together with the relevant agencies, could establish mechanisms to enhance respect for human rights and also to secure the protection of minorities in Croatia.

15. It should be stressed that the functions identified in paragraph 9 above cannot be performed without the active cooperation of the parties, and in particular the Government of Croatia. As I recalled in paragraph 34 (c) of my earlier report (S/1995/730), the human rights function will require UNCRO to monitor the functioning of the Croatian police in those parts of Croatia in which a minority Serb community remains. I welcome the declared willingness of the Government of Croatia to adhere to the highest international standards in the realm of human rights and expect that the services of UNCRO will help the Government to redeem its pledge.

16. I therefore recommend that the Security Council approve the arrangements set out in the present report. They would apply to the remainder of UNCRO's current mandate, pending ongoing negotiations on the ultimate future of Sector East in the context of an overall political settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. I shall revert to the Council on any modifications required in the light of those negotiations.

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Security Council

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S/1995/836
2 October 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION

(1 April-30 September 1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report gives an account of the activities of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) in pursuance of the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council in resolutions 687 (1991), 689 (1991) and 806 (1993).

II. ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS IRAQ-KUWAIT OBSERVATION MISSION AND THE SITUATION IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

2. During the period under review, the situation in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) was calm. There were very few violations of the DMZ and those that occurred were minor, mainly overflights by unidentified aircraft. UNIKOM received six formal complaints: two from Iraq and four from Kuwait. None of these could be confirmed.

3. During the fishing season from May to July, Iraqi fishing boats were frequently observed operating close to the shore in Kuwaiti waters. After UNIKOM raised the issue with the Iraqi authorities, this activity diminished greatly.

4. The Kuwaiti authorities erected a barbed-wire fence running parallel to the trench and the berm from the coast to the Abdaly crossing.

5. UNIKOM monitored the DMZ from patrol and observation bases and observation points and through ground and air patrols. It also operated checkpoints and carried out investigations. It maintained liaison with the two sides at all levels. The deployment of UNIKOM is shown on the attached map.

6. UNIKOM continued to act in coordination with the authorities of Iraq and Kuwait in cases of unauthorized border crossings and when responding to requests to facilitate repatriation. The Mission also exchanged information and closely

cooperated on such matters with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

7. At the request of ICRC, UNIKOM provided the venue and support for meetings of the Technical Subcommittee on Military and Civilian Missing Prisoners of War and Mortal Remains on 29 and 30 August and 26 and 27 September 1995.

8. In my last report (S/1995/251, para. 14), I reported the apprehension and detention by the Iraqi authorities of two United States citizens who had mistakenly crossed the border on 13 March 1995. The two men were released on 16 July 1995.

III. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

9. As of September 1995, the overall strength of UNIKOM was 1,331, as follows:

(a) 244 military observers from Argentina (7), Austria (7), Bangladesh (9), Canada (5), China (15), Denmark (6), Fiji (6), Finland (6), France (15), Ghana (6), Greece (7), Hungary (7), India (6), Indonesia (6), Ireland (7), Italy (6), Kenya (7), Malaysia (7), Nigeria (6), Pakistan (7), Poland (6), Romania (7), the Russian Federation (15), Senegal (6), Singapore (6), Sweden (6), Thailand (6), Turkey (6), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (15), the United States of America (15), Uruguay (6) and Venezuela (2);

(b) An infantry battalion of 775 from Bangladesh;

(c) An engineer unit of 50 from Argentina;

(d) A logistics unit of 35 from Denmark;

(e) 227 civilian staff, of whom 80 were recruited internationally.

Major-General Krishna N. S. Thapa (Nepal) continued as Force Commander.

10. UNIKOM was supported by a chartered helicopter and a chartered fixed-wing aircraft. The former is currently being replaced by a unit from Bangladesh.

11. Medical services were provided on a temporary basis by a contractor. Germany has now offered to provide a civilian medical unit. Germany would thus become a new contributor to UNIKOM. I propose to accept this offer, with the concurrence of the Security Council.

12. The headquarters of UNIKOM remains in Umm Qasr. The Mission also maintains liaison offices in Baghdad and Kuwait City. The latter was moved in March and is now collocated with UNIKOM's support centre in Kuwait City.

IV. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

13. The General Assembly, by its resolution 49/245 of 12 July 1995, authorized me to enter into commitments for the period ending 30 June 1996 in the amount of $1,811,900 gross ($1,594,100 net) per month, equivalent to one third of the maintenance of UNIKOM, in addition to the two-thirds share of $3,188,100 per month to be met through voluntary contributions from the Government of Kuwait. This authorization is subject to review by the Security Council with regard to the mandate of the Mission. Assessments on Member States have been made for the period ending 31 October 1995 and the Government of Kuwait has paid its voluntary contributions for the period ending 31 October 1995.

14. As at 22 September 1995, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNIKOM for the period since the inception of the Mission amounted to $37,283,547. The total unpaid assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations amounted to $2.4 billion.

V. OBSERVATIONS

15. During the period under review, the Iraq-Kuwait border and the DMZ have been generally calm. Through its presence and activities, UNIKOM continued to contribute significantly to the calm that prevailed in the area of operation. In carrying out its tasks, UNIKOM enjoyed the effective cooperation of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti authorities. I recommend that the Mission be maintained.

16. In conclusion, I wish to pay tribute to Major-General Thapa and the men and women under his command for the manner in which they have discharged their responsibilities. Their discipline and bearing have been of a high order, reflecting credit on themselves, on their countries and on the United Nations.



Map No. 3637 Rev. 9 UNITED NATIONS
October 1995

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/494
S/1995/837
3 October 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 44
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 2 October 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to our earlier letters concerning Israeli practices and repeated Israeli attacks in Southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa, I have the honour to inform you of a series of Israeli attacks that occurred during the first half of September 1995:

1 September 1995

Israeli forces shelled areas outside Kafr Tibnit, Nabatiyah al-Fawqa, Zawtar al-Sharqiyah and Zawtar al-Gharbiyah.

2 September 1995

Israeli forces shelled the area outside Jba' and the outskirts of Maydun.

3 September 1995

Israeli forces shelled areas outside Majdal Silm and Jumayjimah.

Israeli military aircraft overflew the areas of Nabatiya and Na'imah and dropped heat balloons.

4 September 1995

Israeli forces shelled areas outside Kafr Rumman, Nabatiya al-Fawqa, Arabsalim, Humin al-Fawqa, the course of the Zahrani River and the Iqlim al-Tuffah district.

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5 September 1995

Israeli military aircraft overflew the Iqlim al-Tuffah district.

6 September 1995

Israeli forces shelled areas outside Arabsalim, Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar, the Mlita hills, Jabal Safi, Jba' and Ayn Qana, with the result that a house in Jba was damaged and 7,000 square metres of fruit trees were burned outside Jba' and Ayn Qana.

Israeli forces proceeded to raze a house in the town of Rayhan for the purpose of building barricades to fortify their positions.

7 September 1995

Israeli forces shelled the periphery of Mashgharah and areas outside the town of Humin al-Fawqa, Arabsalim and Jarju'.

Israeli military aircraft overflew the districts of Nabatiya, Tibnin, Iqlim al-Tuffah and Sidon as well as the camps located there, breaking the sound barrier and carrying out mock attacks.

9 September 1995

Israeli forces shelled areas outside Tibnin, Bra'shit, Shaqra, Ayta al-Jabal and Haris.

10 September 1995

Israeli forces shelled Tibnin, Bra'shit, Haddatha, Haris, Ayta al-Jabal and Shaqra.

Israeli military aircraft overflew the districts of Nabatiya and Iqlim al-Tuffah, carrying out mock attacks.

11 September 1995

Israeli forces on two occasions shelled areas outside Tibnin, Bra'shit, Haddatha, Haris, Shaqra, Ayta al-Jabal, Ghanduriyah, Frun, Qallawiyah, Kafra, Yatar, Majdal Silm, Khirbat Silm, Tulin, Qabrikha and Sawwanah, with the result that one girl was wounded and one woman suffered a nervous breakdown.

Israeli military aircraft overflew the districts of Nabatiya, Tyre and the western Bekaa, breaking the sound barrier and carrying out a number of mock attacks.

Israeli helicopters combed the wadis and thickets around Bra'shit, Shaqra, Majdal Silm, Qabrikha, Tulin, Tibnin, Sawwanah, Khirbat Silm, Kafra and Yatar.

13 September 1995

Israeli forces shelled areas outside Tibnin, Ayta al-Jabal, Haddatha, Haris, Jarju', Arabsalim, Ayn Bu Siwar and the Jabal Safi and Mlita hills.

14 September 1995

Israeli military aircraft overflew the Alayh district.

Israeli forces shelled areas outside Qabrikha, Tulin and Majdal Silm.

15 September 1995

Fire broke out in Matn, outside the town of Kafr Uqab, as a result of the dropping of heat balloons by Israeli military aircraft.

17 September 1995

Israeli forces shelled areas outside Kafra, Yatar, Haris, Haddatha, Ayta al-Jabal and Tibnin.

The Lebanese Government strongly condemns the repeated Israeli attacks, which have brought enormous damage to property. It further condemns in the strongest terms the arbitrary practices against civilians that have prevented them from cultivating their fields, pursuing their occupations and earning their livelihoods.

Like previous attacks, this new series constitutes flagrant aggression against the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and represents another flagrant violation of international law and fundamental human rights.

The continued violence is ultimately due to Israel's maintenance of its occupation and its refusal to comply with Security Council resolution 425 (1978), which calls for Israel's withdrawal to the internationally recognized boundaries and for the Lebanese Government to be allowed to extend its authority over all its territory by means of its legally constituted forces.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 44 of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/838
3 October 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 OCTOBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I should like to draw your attention to documents S/1995/831, S/1995/832 and S/1995/833, containing letters dated 28 September 1995, 28 September 1995, and 27 September 1995, respectively, signed "Vladislav Jovanović, Ambassador, Chargé d'affaires a.i." of the "Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations".

1. My Government wishes to reiterate its objection to the publication of the above letters as documents of the United Nations, as stated previously on the occasion of the publication of letters signed by Mr. Bratislav Djordjević (A/50/333-S/1995/659). Mr. Jovanović does not represent a Member State of the United Nations and thus has no authority to request publication of documents.

The designation of "Yugoslavia" as a State within the framework of the United Nations is related to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), a State whose process of dissolution into five successor States was initiated on 8 October 1991, and terminated on 29 April 1992. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Slovenia are all equal successors to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, along with the remaining Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, which have formed a federal State that they call the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The relevant resolutions of the Security Council (777 (1992) and 821 (1993)) and of the General Assembly (47/1) of 19 September 1992, have stated clearly and unequivocally that the "State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist", that "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" and that "the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership of the United Nations". Since the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" has not yet applied for membership in the Organization, it can only be concluded that it is not a Member State.

We wish to recall that Mr. Dragomir Djokić, the previous "Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations", was appointed by the then Acting Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mr. Milivoje Maksić, on 31 March 1992 - during the period while the process of dissolution of the former common State was still going on.

Although the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist, it has been allowed to continue to perform some of the functions of a United Nations Member State and its old flag still flies the mast at the United Nations. In view of this situation, until Serbia and Montenegro are admitted into membership of the United Nations, Mr. Djokić was being allowed to act as a representative of "Yugoslavia" within the United Nations system, since he was appointed at a time when the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia still existed as a State, by a then legitimate representative of that State. However, Mr. Jovanović cannot be considered a representative of any "Yugoslavia", since he was appointed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of a country that is not a Member State of the United Nations.

2. Further, the letter dated 28 September 1995 (S/1995/831) implies that the Republic of Croatia is not abiding by the Security Council resolution 752 (1992). The letter quotes the demand contained in that resolution that "all troops from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina be withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina". However, the resolution is quoted inaccurately, since it states, in its paragraph 4, that it "demands that those units of the Yugoslav People's Army and elements of the Croatian Army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina must either be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective international monitoring".

As stated in the statement of my Foreign Minister (S/1995/812, annex), elements of the Croatian Army are present in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but are subject to a bilateral treaty between the two Governments. Thus they are subject to the authority of the Government of the Republic/ Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, the requirements of resolution 752 (1992) are fulfilled.

My Government welcomes the statement from the letter stating that "the 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)' was only constituted a year after" the conflict began, thus clearly confirming that this new "Yugoslavia" is in earnest a new international legal entity, notwithstanding the fact that it is one of the five successor States to the former common State, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This clarification should facilitate the conclusion of the negotiations on the succession issue.

3. With regard to the letter dated 28 September 1995 (S/1995/832), claiming that the Croatian Army has attacked the territory of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)", by opening fire from the location of Cesmina Glava towards the positions of the "Army of Yugoslavia" at the location of Prasna Rupa, I would like to recall the Croatian position set forth in the letter dated 6 September 1995 (S/1995/770) and the map enclosed in that letter, from which it is visible that the location in question - claimed to be inside

the territory of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" - is actually located approximately 1,100 metres inside the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This once again confirms that the authorities of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" lay claim to the territory of other Member States. It further confirms that regular units of the "Army of Yugoslavia" are present on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in clear violation of both Security Council resolution 752 (1992) and resolutions 943 (1994), 970 (1995), 988 (1995) and 1015 (1995).

4. With regard to the letter dated 27 September 1995 (S/1995/833), I would like to reiterate the statement made by my Foreign Minister on 20 September 1995 (S/1995/812, annex) with regard to the joint Croatian-Bosnian military operations in the western part of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I would kindly request your assistance in circulating the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/839
5 October 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 OCTOBER 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to my report to the Security Council concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, of 7 August 1995 (S/1995/657), in which I informed the Council of my intention to appoint a resident deputy to my Special Envoy who would also serve as the Head of Mission of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). As you will recall, the Security Council, in a statement by its President on 18 August 1995 (S/PRST/1995/39), took note with appreciation of my decision in this regard.

I now wish to inform the Security Council that I have appointed Mr. Liviu Bota to the above-mentioned position with effect from 1 October 1995. As the Council is aware, Mr. Bota is a senior official of the United Nations, which he has served with great distinction since 1971, and recently he was Head of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) from January 1993 to March 1995.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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S/1995/840
5 October 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 OCTOBER 1995 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 2 October 1995 (S/1995/839) concerning the appointment of Mr. Liviu Bota as resident deputy to your Special Envoy and Head of Mission of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They take note of the information contained in your letter and agree with the proposal made therein.

(Signed) Ibrahim A. GAMBARI
President of the Security Council

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/510
S/1995/841
6 October 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 54
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 3 October 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward herewith a letter dated 30 September 1995, addressed to you by Mr. Abdul Rahim Ghafoorzai, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 54, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. G. Ravan FARHÂDI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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ANNEX

Letter dated 30 September 1995 from the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan to the Secretary-General

Upon instruction from President Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and the Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, pursuant to our letters contained in documents S/1995/767, S/1995/791 and S/1995/795 and in reference to your letter of 22 September 1995, I have the honour to communicate to you the following:

While deeply appreciative of the continuous efforts of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, we are aware of the magnitude of the task of the Special Mission both within the country, to facilitate national rapprochement, and in the international community, to mobilize support for the cause of peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan, as called for by the General Assembly in its resolution 49/140 of 20 December 1994 and in subsequent Security Council presidential statements.

I wish to refer to the important provisions of paragraph 4 of the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution, on the imperative character of the cessation of foreign interferences in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, to assure peace in the country. This objective, yet to be achieved, has been further jeopardized as a result of the recent negative developments.

To effectively achieve this goal, the United Nations is to further strengthen the capabilities of the Special Mission. We believe that your efforts and those of Ambassador Mahmoud Mestiri, Head of the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan, would benefit from the establishment of a contact group on Afghanistan composed of States, but not the ones immediately involved, as well as of interested organizations.

Such contact groups have been established to support your peace-making efforts in other parts of the world. Their achievements suggest that the creation of such a mechanism in the case of Afghanistan can play a constructive role in the country as well as for the cause of peace and stability in the region.

Afghanistan, as a war-stricken country, experiencing major economic and humanitarian problems, is suffering from a lack of adequate international attention. A contact group on Afghanistan could raise the level of international awareness about the root causes and dimensions of the conflict, and assist the United Nations Special Mission to accelerate and enhance its endeavours, thus creating an atmosphere conducive to the return of complete peace, normalcy and national rapprochement, as well as reconstruction and rehabilitation of the country. Meanwhile the United Nations has been requested to reopen its offices in the capital city, Kabul, where peace and security withstand.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan, therefore, proposes the establishment of a contact group on Afghanistan, composed of States and organizations dedicated

to facilitating the ongoing search for peace as well as the mobilization of the United Nations and international assistance for the reconstruction of the country.

With a mandate to support the good offices of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Special Mission, the contact group on Afghanistan might include representatives of institutions like the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the European Union, as well as of other States and organizations that you, in consultation with the Islamic State of Afghanistan, deem appropriate for the above-mentioned objectives.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Abdul Rahim GHAFOORZAI
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/842
4 October 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 1008 (1995) of 7 August 1995, in which the Council decided, inter alia, to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III until 8 February 1996. It covers the main developments since my report of 17 July 1995 (S/1995/588).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. The most significant political events during the last two months have been the meetings between President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and Mr. Jonas Savimbi in Franceville (Gabon) on 10 August and in Brussels on 25 September. During the first meeting, the two leaders agreed on modalities to continue their bilateral discussions on the completion of the formation of the Forças Armadas Angolanas (FAA), including the global incorporation of the troops of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in FAA. General understandings were also reached on ways to define the powers and responsibilities of the two Vice-Presidents and on various aspects of holding legislative and presidential elections. In Brussels, the two leaders consulted further on those issues and reached agreement on consolidating the peace process and the progress achieved so far.

3. The Franceville and Brussels meetings also helped to improve mutual trust and confidence between the Government and UNITA. Numerous contacts between them have continued at other levels, strengthening the process of dialogue and creating better understanding.

4. My Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, has continued his efforts to facilitate implementation of the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex) with the support of the three observer States (Portugal, Russian Federation and United States of America). To ensure effective follow-up to the Franceville meeting, he had useful meetings with President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, as well as with the Heads of State of Gabon and the Congo.

5. The Joint Commission, the principal body charged with implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, has continued to meet regularly under the chairmanship of my Special Representative in both ordinary and special sessions and has also visited some of the quartering areas.

6. The Joint Commission held its eighth special session on 19 August 1995 in Uige (headquarters of the northern region), after travelling there by road from Luanda through Government- and UNITA-controlled areas. Similar journeys are planned for the future in order to strengthen confidence in the peace process. A joint statement was issued on 25 August by the Angolan Government and UNITA on the subject of discussion at Uige, the free movement of persons and goods. Both parties reaffirmed their intention to guarantee free movement of persons and goods throughout the territory with certain controls at border posts and access points to cities. Violations of the right of movement were reported to the Joint Commission for appropriate remedial action.

7. Discussions between UNAVEM and the Government on the establishment of a UNAVEM radio station are continuing. In the meantime, UNAVEM is using the airtime allotted to it on Angolan radio and television to promote the basic objectives of the Lusaka Protocol and to create a better understanding of the mandate and role of the United Nations in Angola.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Observance of the cease-fire

8. The more rapid induction of UNAVEM's formed units and their deployment in the various provinces have contributed to the further stabilization of the military situation and stricter respect for the cease-fire. Reported cease-fire violations have shown a steady decline, from 110 in July to 95 in August and 52 in September, which is the lowest level recorded to date. UNAVEM attempts to investigate all allegations and has so far verified 32 incidents. Major obstacles to verification include inadequate and belated reporting, restrictions on the free movement of observers and lack of guarantees for their security, as well as the inaccessibility of some areas.

9. The situation in most regions is relatively calm and stable, except for isolated clashes and numerous acts of banditry. As agreed between the parties, their troops have remained generally in situ. However, tensions persist, particularly in the diamond rich area of Lucapa in the north-east, where both sides are seeking to consolidate and enlarge the areas they control. Reinforcements and sporadic shelling by both sides have also been reported in the northern region. In addition, there has been some tension in the southern region in recent weeks. UNAVEM continues to investigate all cease-fire violations and troop movements, as well as to mediate between the parties to defuse tension and avert a resumption of hostilities.

B. Quartering process and demining

10. With regard to the establishment of the quartering areas for UNITA troops, significant progress has been made, although much remains to be done. UNAVEM has reconnoitred all 15 proposed quartering areas, and 11 of them have been approved by the parties. Confirmation of the remaining four has been delayed because of the absence of either FAA or UNITA representatives on the joint reconnaissance missions arranged by UNAVEM.

11. The establishment of the quartering areas has begun and work at Vila Nova and Londiumbali, both in the central province of Huambo, has been practically completed. Three other quartering areas, at Negage in Uige and Quibaxe in Kwanza Norte and Quibala in Kwanza Sul, are expected to be ready by the third week of October. Progress has been slow, owing to inadequate conditions and delays in the arrival of personnel contributed by UNITA to undertake construction work. In order to expedite the process, UNAVEM has requested a commercial contractor to assist in the establishment of the remaining 10 quartering areas. The Demobilization and Reintegration Office of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit has finalized preparations for the humanitarian assistance programme in the quartering areas.

12. Most of the data-processing equipment needed for the registration of UNITA soldiers has been received and is ready for distribution. United Nations Volunteers (UNVs), who are to carry out the registration in the quartering areas, have started arriving in Angola.

13. In order to enhance internal coordination and decision-making during the prequartering and quartering phases, a coordination group, chaired by my Special Representative's Deputy, has been set up. Management structures defining the responsibilities of the various components and agencies involved have also been established.

14. Demining activities by FAA and UNITA have continued, in a few cases jointly. Some demining equipment has been issued by UNAVEM to UNITA. But there is a need for both parties to organize themselves better in order to increase the effectiveness of their demining activities. During August, the roads from Ucua to Quibaxe (northern region) and from Menongue to Caiundo (south-eastern region) were successfully demined. The demining of the road from Menongue to Chitembo was also completed on 28 September. However, UNAVEM continues to investigate allegations about renewed laying of mines. These allegations are particularly worrying and the Joint Commission has demanded that all parties put an end to such practices.

15. In order to augment the parties' efforts, the United Nations has contracted a commercial company from South Africa to undertake mine clearance and verification on approximately 7,000 kilometres of roads that are vital for the deployment and effective operation of United Nations troops. The company will start work shortly. Its work will be of benefit also to the free circulation of people and the quartering of troops.

16. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been active in mine-awareness training and demining in several provinces. Special emphasis has

been given to risk reduction in the quartering areas now under construction. Mine survey activities have also proceeded, although with difficulty in some areas because of access limitations. Nine UNAVEM instructors for the National Mine Training School have started working at an interim school site. The Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Explosives (INAROE) is recruiting 250 deminers, including 50 from UNITA, to be trained and equipped for mine-clearing.

C. Implementation of the Lusaka Protocol

17. On 10 August in Franceville, President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi confirmed the principle of global incorporation of UNITA troops into FAA and gradual demobilization until the total strength of FAA is reduced to 90,000 troops. The modalities for the formation of FAA are entrusted to the Joint General Staff, which has established a standing committee composed of a small group of high-ranking officers working under the direct supervision of President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. A high-ranking military delegation led by the Chief of Staff of UNITA forces arrived in Luanda on 18 September to begin discussions with the Government on this issue. The standing committee is also authorized to assist the Joint Commission in stabilizing the military situation.

18. With the deployment of detachments of the Portuguese signals company in all six regions, most of the technical and functional problems affecting triangular communications between the Angolan parties and UNAVEM III have been resolved. The status of triangular contacts is currently satisfactory, despite the reluctance of the Government and UNITA to assign liaison officers to UNAVEM regional headquarters.

19. So far, no additional military data have been provided to UNAVEM other than those given by both parties in the meetings of the General Staff at Lusaka in 1994 and a computation of its total strength provided later by UNITA. UNAVEM continues to urge both parties to submit detailed information about the strength and location of their troops and equipment. It is also awaiting detailed information on the arrangements for the quartering of UNITA forces and for the return to barracks of FAA troops, as well as for the incorporation and demobilization processes.

D. UNAVEM deployment and strength

20. In addition to the 54 existing team sites, five new sites will become operational soon.

21. The strength of United Nations formed units has almost reached 5,000 all ranks and their deployment is proceeding smoothly, despite the late arrival of some contingents. Following the Uruguayan infantry battalion, the Indian battalion has been fully operational since early August 1995. The Zimbabwean and Romanian battalions have arrived and their deployment in the north-eastern and southern regions, respectively, is almost complete. In the south-eastern region, infantry units from Argentina and Zambia are expected to be deployed by the end of October. The advance party of the Brazilian infantry battalion has

arrived and the Unit will complete its induction in the eastern region by the end of October.

22. The Portuguese logistics company, a third-line transport unit, completed induction of its first part on 30 August and is currently staying at Lobito and Huambo. Following the departure of the United Kingdom logistics battalion in early August, a logistic support contract was put in place. As I have previously reported, the Indian Engineer Squadron and the Romanian Field Hospital are fully operational. The Brazilian engineer squadron and the advance dressing stations started deployment to designated areas, while the Russian helicopter unit is fully operational. An engineer squadron from Bangladesh, the Argentine naval unit and a bridging company from the Republic of Korea have conducted detailed reconnaissance and will arrive in early October. The bridging company from the Republic of Korea and another from a Member State yet to be determined, following Bulgaria's recent decision to withdraw its offer, will be deployed on the basis of operational requirements and progress in the opening of roads.

IV. POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

23. As of 28 September, 238 civilian police observers from 20 countries had been deployed to 29 team sites. An additional 22 police observers are expected to be inducted soon, bringing the total strength of the civilian police (CIVPOL) to the authorized level of 260 personnel. CIVPOL continued to discharge its duties by monitoring the activities of the Angolan national police through patrols, visits to police units, prison cells and detention centres and contacts with the local population.

24. Several meetings have been held with officials of the Angolan national police to discuss the quartering of the rapid reaction police and the disarming of the civilian population by the Angolan national police under the supervision of UNAVEM. It is now agreed that these two operations will be undertaken simultaneously with the quartering of UNITA soldiers. The Angolan national police has prepared separate documents relating to the two operations and a programme for adapting its armament and equipment to the nature of its mission. These documents have been presented to the Council of Ministers for approval. There are indications, however, that the Government may delay final decisions until the quartering of UNITA troops has started.

25. The Angolan national police continues to be reluctant to grant unrestricted visits to rapid reaction police units. This makes it difficult for CIVPOL officers to carry out their monitoring duties or obtain details regarding the quartering of the rapid reaction police. The Government has yet to provide information on the strength of the rapid reaction police by location and the armaments at their disposal, citing operational and technical difficulties.

26. The issue of special security for UNITA leaders has yet to be resolved. In addition to the special security arrangements in the Lusaka Protocol, UNITA is asking for special protection and accommodation for its officials in all provincial headquarters. However, the Government is insisting on the letter of the Lusaka Protocol, which provides that only the members of the political

committee and the national and provincial secretaries will be provided with two bodyguards, each selected by UNITA from among its demobilized soldiers and specially trained by the Angolan national police. Other officials are to receive protection from the Angolan State within the framework of constitutional guarantees.

27. CIVPOL is assisting in the investigation of complaints about human rights violations, which my Special Representative continues to receive from the Angolan Government, UNITA and other sources. Frequent violations of human rights continue, particularly by elements of the armed forces and police of both sides. My Special Representative has continued to raise these issues with the Government and UNITA and to express the concerns of the international community.

28. A positive development is the decision of the Joint Commission to inscribe human rights on the agenda of all its regular sessions and to request UNAVEM to report periodically on the general human rights situation in Angola, as well as on the results of its investigations of reported violations. The recruitment of additional human rights monitors for UNAVEM is in progress.

29. During the month of August 10 more prisoners have been released by the Government and UNITA, bringing the total so far to 230. Twenty who should have been freed with the first group are still detained by UNITA. Another 213 detainees on both sides have been visited by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) but are yet to be released. ICRC, with the support of the Joint Commission, continues to press both parties for the release of all prisoners.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

30. Humanitarian assistance activities have continued all over the country. A priority for United Nations agencies and NGOs alike has been to support internally displaced persons returning to their home areas. With the gradual consolidation of the peace process and the reopening of roads, displaced persons have begun to return, particularly in the provinces of Benguela, Huambo, Bié and Bengo. On the other hand, in the province of Uige some 3,000 new displacements have occurred as a result of hostilities between government and UNITA forces.

31. Preparations are under way for the repatriation of some 300,000 Angolan refugees from neighbouring countries. In late July, the Government, UNITA and the representative of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) held talks with the Zambian authorities on a repatriation and reintegration programme for 26,000 Angolan refugees living in Zambia. Meanwhile, some spontaneous repatriation has taken place from the Republic of Zaire to the provinces of Uige and Zaire.

32. With the planting season now starting, the distribution of seeds and agricultural tools to internally displaced persons and other war-affected populations has been of particular importance. Under the coordination of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Ministry of Agriculture, United Nations agencies and NGOs are distributing 7,000 tons of seeds and over 1.2 million agricultural tools. Approximately 60 per cent of the

seeds and tools have been prepositioned in the provinces but distribution has been delayed by access problems in some areas. This is also delaying the return of the displaced persons to their places of origin and barring access to land for agriculture. Provincial humanitarian coordination groups, comprising representatives of both the Government and UNITA, are being set up for all provinces and are now operational in three.

33. Road convoys have continued on the recently opened roads from Lobito to Huambo, Kuito and Menongue, from Lobito to Kwanza Sul province and from Luanda to Ndalatando and Malange. At the end of August, following the reconstruction by UNAVEM III of two bridges on the northern Lobito-Huambo corridor, the World Food Programme (WFP) carried out its first convoy since 1992 from Lobito to Balombo (Benguela province). When the remaining bridge is completed soon, humanitarian convoys will be able to use this route to transport items from Lobito to Huambo. This increased road access has reduced the need for costly airlifts. In mid-July, WFP was able to deliver less than half of its humanitarian assistance by road, but by mid-September the proportion had increased to 70 per cent. However, road access remains a severe obstacle to the provision of humanitarian assistance, as well as to the general improvement of food security, particularly in the eastern half of the country. It is hoped that access will improve with the recent joint statement of the Government and UNITA, reinforcing their commitment to the principle of free circulation of people and goods all over the country (see para. 6 above).

34. In the health sector, a country-wide poliomyelitis vaccination campaign aimed at 500,000 children under the age of 5 was launched at the end of July. Joint Ministry of Health/UNITA/United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) vaccination campaigns against other diseases have been conducted in areas where no vaccination has taken place since 1992. A special health problem is the high rate of trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) in the northern parts of the country, including in areas where quartering sites will be located. Drugs for this disease are among the critical shortfalls in the contributions received for the assistance programme for the quartering areas.

35. The total funding required through voluntary contributions to humanitarian assistance for demobilization and reintegration is US$ 104.5 million, of which US$ 54.4 million is for the immediate priority, namely assistance to the quartering areas. Thus far, the quartering phase has received US$ 19.9 million in confirmed pledges, which represents 37 per cent of the requirement. Four specialists in reintegration programmes have arrived to support the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit Demobilization and Reintegration Office, while a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) consultant has carried out preparatory studies and discussions with the Government and UNITA representatives on the creation of the national reintegration institute and a community referral service that would provide information, advice and support to the demobilized soldiers.

VI. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

36. With the consolidation of the peace process, it is inevitable that ordinary Angolans will increasingly focus their concerns on the social and economic conditions of their everyday life. In spite of the progress in ending the civil war, Angola ranked 164th in UNDP's Human Development Index for 1995. It is imperative that practical and immediate measures be taken to alleviate the severe hardships facing the poorer segments of the population.

37. In order to help Angola to overcome the immediate and long-term challenges of reconstruction and development, United Nations programmes and agencies are elaborating plans for increased participation in development activities and for better coordination of their efforts. With the assistance of UNDP and other agencies, the Angolan Government has mapped out a strategy to take the country out of the current humanitarian crisis and guide it to economic revival and sustained development.

38. In this context, a programme of community rehabilitation and national reconciliation was presented to the first Round-Table Conference of donors held in Brussels on 25 and 26 September 1995 in which both President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi participated. The programme focuses on the revival of production in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, as well as on the rehabilitation of the physical and social infrastructure of the country. It is designed to address both the short-term challenges and the need for macroeconomic reform and stabilization. Its importance to the consolidation of the peace process and revitalization of the economy cannot be overemphasized. The donor community responded at the Round-Table Conference with pledges of over US$ 993 million for small-scale community rehabilitation activities aimed at restoring rural production and mobilizing civil society for the massive reconstruction task ahead as well as for humanitarian assistance.

39. The Round-Table Conference also included a working group on humanitarian assistance, reintegration and demining. The group noted that several activities that are essential preconditions for lasting peace and reconstruction in Angola, such as the quartering of UNITA troops and demobilization of former combatants, are not yet fully funded. Donors were requested to give priority to complete funding of the programmes outlined in the United Nations 1995 inter-agency humanitarian appeal for Angola, which are complementary to the Government's plan for community rehabilitation and national reconciliation.

40. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is collaborating with Angola in the implementation of the Government's new economic and social programme for 1995 and 1996. The main objectives of the economic and social programme are to carry out the urgent tasks of demobilization, reconstruction and resettlement; to improve the delivery of government services; to reduce inflation; to promote sustainable economic growth; and to reduce the burden of the external debt. These objectives are to be implemented with a suitably tight fiscal policy.

41. Collaboration between IMF and the Angolan Government in the implementation of the economic and social programme comprises two stages. In the first stage, Fund staff have agreed to monitor the implementation of the programme over the period from October 1995 to September 1996. The staff-monitored programme

entails no use of the Fund's financial resources. Instead, it is designed to help the Angolan Government to establish a track record in the implementation of coherent and quantified macroeconomic stabilization policies and well-designed structural reforms. If progress under the staff-monitored programme is good, a second stage in the economic stabilization and reform process is expected to be the adoption of a medium-term support programme by an appropriate IMF arrangement. Unlike the staff-monitored programme, Fund support at this stage would include some financing and would permit Angola to approach the Paris Club for debt rescheduling. It is hoped that this arrangement can be approved by the Fund in 1996.

42. The Annual Meetings of the Bretton Woods institutions in mid-October will provide an opportunity to convene an informal meeting of donors to keep them informed of Angola's financial needs and to provide feedback on its progress in implementing the early measures contemplated in the staff-monitored programme. In November, a Fund mission will be in Luanda to review compliance with target dates for the policy measures under the staff-monitored programme; a first review of performance with respect to benchmarks could take place early in 1996. Once a Fund-supported programme is subsequently put in place, it would clear the way for a possible rescheduling of Angola's debt.

43. The World Bank is also actively involved in Angola on many fronts and is planning a substantial increase in its programme. Currently, about US$ 208 million International Development Association (IDA) funds are already available for use in several sectors, including the priority areas of health and education. Eight operations, most approved during 1991/92, offer immediate opportunities to advance priorities highlighted at the Round Table in Brussels.

44. The Bank is also working with the Government to prepare an emergency reconstruction programme and is reactivating work on a wide range of ideas and programmes that had lain dormant for around two years, including an agriculture rehabilitation project and an ambitious manpower training programme. The Bank is also working to prepare operations to rebuild and expand urban water and sanitation systems, especially in Luanda.

45. With funding from the Government of Japan and the Bank, the preparatory process for a community-based rehabilitation programme for Angola was completed and a Social Support Fund (Fundo de Apoio Social) was established. The Social Fund is a critical operation aimed at channelling funds to a wide range of small activities, implemented at the demand of and by communities, often with NGO support. Some 60 projects are under way with about 10 completed. The Bank believes that the Social Support Fund is ready for a full launch and plans to present a US$ 24 million credit for approval to its Executive Directors in November.

46. The Government has asked the Bank to organize a Consultative Group for Angola as part of the effort to mobilize external resources and to coordinate assistance. The Bank tentatively plans a meeting during the second quarter of 1996. It also plans to brief the Special Programme for Africa (SPA), which meets in November, on Angola's progress.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

47. The General Assembly, by its resolution 49/227 B of 20 July 1995, authorized me to enter into commitments at a monthly rate not to exceed US$ 13.9 million gross for the maintenance of UNAVEM III from 9 August to 31 December 1995. In addition, the Assembly has requested me to submit an updated budget for its consideration. The report is currently being prepared and will include the requirements for the current mandate period.

48. As of 22 September 1995, outstanding assessed contributions to the Special Account of UNAVEM III amounted to US$ 117 million. The total unpaid contributions to all peace-keeping operations amounted to US$ 2.4 billion.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

49. During the past two months, UNAVEM has concentrated on ensuring the deployment of formed units and on establishing quartering areas. The deployment of United Nations troops, with the exception of the infantry units assigned to the eastern and south-eastern regions, has proceeded satisfactorily.

50. However, I remain concerned at the slow progress in the quartering process, which is essential for the early implementation of the other provisions of the Lusaka Protocol. I have asked UNAVEM to intensify its efforts to accelerate this process. I also call on the Government and UNITA to finalize promptly the arrangements for the return of FAA to barracks, the quartering of the rapid reaction police and the disarmament of civilians. I also urge both the Government and UNITA to make renewed efforts to conclude without further delay their discussions on the formation of the new armed forces. Unless an equitable and practicable agreement is reached in the near future, this issue could become a serious obstacle to the timely implementation of the quartering process and jeopardize the peace process as a whole.

51. The meetings of President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi in Franceville and Brussels, as well as the continuing dialogue between the Government and UNITA in the framework of the Joint Commission, are gradually generating greater mutual trust and confidence, although there is still some tension at lower levels in certain regions. The joint declaration on the free circulation of persons and goods, as well as the extension of the United Nations presence throughout the country, are also enhancing the credibility of the peace process. But it is important that the parties continue to demonstrate their political will by backing up their declarations with concrete actions on the ground. They should refrain, in particular, from troop movements or military activities that might create tension or lead to renewed hostilities. Their follow-up on their declaration on free circulation, as well as the repatriation of mercenaries, will also be specially important in this context.

52. While the Government's decision to allow UNAVEM access to Angolan radio and television is a positive interim step, it cannot be a substitute for the establishment of a United Nations radio, as provided for in Security Council resolution 976 (1995). I urge the Government to provide all relevant facilities expeditiously, including the allocation of frequencies.

53. I have stressed in previous reports that the continuing goodwill of the international community depends on steady progress in the peace process. I also feel, however, that it is imperative that every effort be made to ensure that the gains achieved so far are sustained and reinforced by increased financial, technical and material assistance from the donor community, especially for the reintegration of demobilized soldiers and the rehabilitation of the Angolan economy. In this regard, I welcome the results of the Brussels Round-Table Conference and hope that the generous response of the international community will soon be translated into specific commitments.

54. In conclusion, I would like to pay tribute to my Special Representative and to the Force Commander, Major General Chris Garuba, who completed his tour of duty on 30 September when he was succeeded by Major General Phillip Sibanda (Zimbabwe), as well as to all the military, police and civilian staff of UNAVEM III, for their dedication to the cause of peace under difficult conditions. I also wish to thank the personnel of the United Nations agencies and programmes and NGOs for their untiring efforts to alleviate the suffering of the Angolan people.

Annex I

UNAVEM III - Military and civilian police personnel

(as of 26 September 1995)

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops	Total
Algeria	9				9
Argentina	2	1			3
Bangladesh	10	11	21		42
Brazil	30 a/	17	39	255	341
Bulgaria	10	10			20
Congo	8				8
Egypt	10	15			25
Fiji		10			10
France	8		3		11
Guinea-Bissau	20	3			23
Hungary	10	11			21
India	20	18	49	1 014	1 101
Jordan	20	20			40
Kenya	10				10
Malaysia	20	20			40
Mali	10	10			20
Morocco		1			1
Netherlands	15	8			23
New Zealand	6		7		13
Nigeria	21	20			41
Norway	4				4
Pakistan	5		1		6
Poland	7				7
Portugal	8	11	20	209	248
Romania			26	868	894

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Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops	Total
Russian Federation		10		153	163
Senegal	10				10
Slovakia	5				5
Sweden	16				16
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland			6		6
United Republic of Tanzania		5			5
Uruguay	10	9	37	800	856
Zambia	10	15	1		26
Zimbabwe	21	22	36	804	883
Total	335 a/	247	246	4 103	4 931

a/ Including 11 medical personnel.

Annex II

Map No. 3881 Rev. 6 UNITED NATIONS
September 1995

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/843
6 October 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 OCTOBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose the text of the Guiding Basic Principles for Negotiations for the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem with the rest of the Republic of Croatia, signed by the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Croatian Serb authorities in eastern Slavonia, on 3 October 1995 at Erdut, Croatia.

I would request your kind assistance in distributing the present letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

95-30062 (E) 061095 091095

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Annex

Guiding Basic Principles for Negotiations on a Settlement of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem

1. A transition period shall be established for the region.

2. A transitional authority shall be established by the United Nations Security Council to administer the region during the transition period. Such authority shall include a mechanism to represent the interests of the Government of Croatia, the local Serbs, returning Croatian refugees and displaced persons, and ethnic minorities.

3. International forces shall be stationed within the region during the transition to maintain the peace and enforce compliance with the final settlement. The region shall otherwise be demilitarized during the transition.

4. The transitional authority will facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. It will also take steps to re-establish Croatian institutions in the region (such as telephone service, post offices, banks, utilities, pension offices, passport and citizenship offices, etc.).

5. The transitional authority shall establish a transitional police force in which Croats and Serbs are represented. Other ethnic groups shall also be represented in the police force in the regions where they are present.

6. Internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms will receive the highest respect from all levels of government throughout the Republic of Croatia.

7. All Croatian citizens and persons eligible for Croatian citizenship, including all refugees and displaced persons, have the right to return freely to their places of residence and reside there in conditions of security.

8. All persons have the right to have restored to them any property of which they were deprived by unlawful acts or forced to abandon and to be compensated for any property which cannot be restored to them.

9. The right to return, to recover property, to receive compensation for non-recoverable property, and to receive assistance in reconstruction of damaged property shall be equally available to all Croatian citizens and persons eligible for Croatian citizenship, without regard to ethnicity.

10. The international community will provide guarantees of the terms of and the human rights protections established in the settlement. These guarantees would include the presence of international monitors for an agreed period of time in the region both during and following the transition. This work shall not be impeded.

11. After the end of the transitional period, elections for local administration shall be held.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1995/844
6 October 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the Security Council the attached communication, dated 6 October 1995, which he has received from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

95-29990 (E) 091095 101095

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Annex

Letter dated 6 October 1995 from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary General

Paragraph 8 of resolution 715 (1991), adopted by the Security Council on 11 October 1991, requests the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit to the Security Council reports on the implementation of the Agency's plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of resolution 687 (1991). These reports are to be submitted when requested by the Security Council and, in any event, at least every six months after the adoption of resolution 715.

Accordingly, I am requesting you kindly to transmit to the President of the Security Council the enclosed eighth six-month report on the implementation of the Plan. I remain available for any consultations you or the Council may wish to have.

(Signed) Hans BLIX

Appendix

Eighth report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the implementation of the Agency's plan for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of Resolution 687 (1991)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 11 October 1991, the Security Council adopted resolution 715 (1991) approving, inter alia, the plan submitted in document S/22872/Rev.1 and S/22872/Rev.1/Corr.1 by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with paragraph 12 of Part C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and with the requirements of paragraphs 3 and 5 of resolution 707 (1991). In paragraph 8 of resolution 715, the Security Council requested the Director General of the IAEA to submit to it reports on the implementation of the plan when requested by the Security Council and, in any event, at least every six months after the adoption of resolution 715.

2. The Director General submits herewith the eighth six-month report[1] on implementation of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification related to Iraq's nuclear capabilities (hereinafter referred to as the Plan).

II. IRAQ'S PAST NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME

3. As indicated in paragraph 12 of the latest report of the Director General to the Security Council,[2] a detailed analysis of the documents seized in Iraq in September 1991 in the course of the sixth IAEA inspection revealed the absence of documentation concerning the progress of Iraq's covert nuclear programme - Petrochemical Project 3 (PC3) - post-dating the progress report for the period 1 January - 31 May 1990 of the Al Atheer project. This gave rise to uncertainties regarding PC3 activities in the period which preceded the Gulf War, i.e., between June 1990 and mid-January 1991. Furthermore, none of the seized documents contained information on gas centrifuge enrichment research and development, except for indications that it had been started in mid-1987 with the transfer to gas centrifuge enrichment programme of staff who had been working on gaseous diffusion.

4. Until recently, the Iraqi explanation for the absence of relevant documentation on these two aspects was that the invasion of Kuwait had brought all IAEC activities to a virtual halt and that the centrifuge enrichment project was outside PC3 and its documentation handling would have been separated.

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1 The Director General has so far submitted seven reports, circulated on 15 April 1992, as S/23813; on 28 October 1992, as S/24722; on 19 April 1993, as S/25621; on 3 November 1993, as S/26685; on 22 April 1994, as S/1994/490; on 10 October 1994, as S/1994/1151; and on 11 April 1995, as S/1995/287, supplemented on 21 July, with S/1995/604.

2 See document S/1995/287 of 11 April 1995

5. As discussed below, recent events have led to the provision by Iraq of hundreds of thousands of pages of documents relating to activities of PC3 and to Iraq's centrifuge enrichment programme, as well as to the other aspects of its covert nuclear weapons programme.

6. Following the arrival in Jordan on 8 August 1995 of General Hussein Kamel, the former Iraqi Minister of Industry and Military Industrialisation, the Director General of the IAEA was invited by the Iraqi Government to come to Baghdad or to send an IAEA delegation in order to receive information concerning Iraq's past nuclear programme, allegedly previously withheld at the instruction of General Hussein Kamel.

7. An IAEA delegation travelled to Baghdad and held talks with the Iraqi authorities from 17 to 20 August. In addition to providing new details on some aspects of their past nuclear programme, Iraqi officials provided information and supporting documents on a hitherto undisclosed project said to have been ordered by General Hussein Kamel shortly after the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. According to Iraqi officials, the project consisted of a crash programme which was launched in September 1990 to extract and further enrich the highly enriched uranium (HEU) contained in safeguarded research reactor fuel at the Tuwaitha site and thus to accelerate the availability of weapons-grade material for the fabrication of a nuclear device. Had the programme been completed, this operation could have provided enough material for such a device in a shorter time than would have been necessary under Iraq's covert programme to enrich natural uranium.

8. With a view to delaying as long as possible detection by the IAEA of the diversion of the safeguarded fuel, the extraction operation had been ordered to start immediately after the twice-yearly safeguards inspection, the next of which was scheduled for November 1990 and was to be concluded before the next inspection, which was expected to take place six months later. The Iraqi officials stated that the manufacturing, assembling and testing of the equipment needed to extract the uranium from the safeguarded fuel was completed in late January 1991. As it turned out, the extraction process itself was never begun. The damage caused by the coalition air raids on Tuwaitha and other relevant facilities made further work on the project impossible. The first post-war inspection mission in Iraq in May 1991 fully accounted for the safeguarded reactor fuel confirming that none of the HEU contained in the research reactor fuel, was used for the recently declared crash programme.

9. In addition to disclosing the existence and scope of the crash programme, information was provided to the IAEA by Iraq in August 1995 concerning activities of PC3 in the second half of 1990, as well as details on other aspects of their past nuclear programme, as described below:

a. An oral description was given of the progress made by the weaponization team of PC3, responsible for the design and fabrication of nuclear weapons, during the second half of 1990. This included an explanation of the contribution by the Al Qa Qaa State Establishment in the development of the implosive package. To substantiate their statements, Iraqi officials provided a copy of the progress report of the weaponization team, covering the period from 1 June 1990 to 7 June 1991, which had been issued on 10 September 1991. This detailed document of 198 pages is particularly important since it relates to a period of time not covered by the documents seized by the sixth IAEA inspection team in September 1991 (see paragraph 3 above). The report, which has already been translated, indicates that work on

weaponization in Al Atheer and in Tuwaitha continued through mid-January 1991, and that post-war activities were concentrated on the salvaging of equipment.

b. Iraqi officials finally confirmed, as the IAEA has long believed, that the centrifuge enrichment program had been carried out in the so-called Engineering Design Centre (Rashdiya), located in the northern suburbs of Baghdad, and not in Tuwaitha as previously declared. It was also stated that some limited work had continued, at Rashdiya during 1988/1989 which had led to the successful development of a gas diffusion barrier. This latter activity - said to have been discontinued in 1989 - is unlikely to have had any practical consequence for the nuclear weapons programme, but is indicative of the capabilities of Iraqi scientists and engineers and of their perseverance in the face of repeated failures.

10. On 20 August 1995, just prior to the departure of the IAEA delegation from Baghdad, Iraqi authorities announced the discovery of thousands of documents, and several tons of metals and other materials, on a farm said to be owned by the family of General Hussein Kamel. The documents were transferred to the premises of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC), where a joint IAEA/UNSCOM team, composed of linguists and experts in the various disciplines, completed in three weeks an inventory of all of the documents, sorted, according to their subject, into four categories - nuclear, chemical, biological and missiles. The documentary material, which included technical records, drawings, suppliers catalogues and extracts from scientific and technical publications, amounted to some 680,000 pages, of which some 80% related to Iraq's past nuclear programme. After having been inventoried, the nuclear-related documents were removed from the BMVC to IAEA Headquarters in Vienna. In order to facilitate their evaluation all documents are being transferred onto computer compatible media to allow for computer-assisted analysis of the text. The transfer is expected to be completed by the end of October 1995. Although it has not yet been physically possible to conduct more than a cursory review of these documents, they touch upon many aspects of the covert nuclear weapons programme, including numerous technical reports on the centrifuge enrichment programme which are of particular interest to the IAEA to verify the completeness of the IAEA's knowledge in this area (see paragraph 3 above).[3]

11. The metals and other material were also transported to the BMVC, where samples were taken; analyses to assess their relevance to Iraq's programmes for weapons of mass destruction are now underway.

12. Following the talks in Baghdad the IAEA team travelled to Jordan to meet with General Hussein Kamel. His detailed description of the past

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[3] As indicated in paragraph 11 of the previous report to the Council (S/1995/287), the IAEA has never accepted as credible repeated Iraqi statements that no documents relevant to the past nuclear weapons programme, other than those confiscated during IAEA-6, were any longer available as all of them had been destroyed. While the large amount of documents provided by Iraqi authorities on 20 August 1995 proves the correctness of the IAEA convictions, the IAEA continues to be persuaded that complete documentation of Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme still exists somewhere in Iraq. Efforts will therefore continue to obtain access to all documents relevant to the programme, as required under paragraph 3 ii) of the Security Council resolution 707 (1991) and paragraphs 3 and 5 of resolution 715 (1991).

covert nuclear weapons programme provided useful information. The possibility of further contacts and discussion was left open.

13. The sheer magnitude of the documentation provided by Iraq makes it impossible, at this stage, to draw definitive conclusions as to their content and implications. It is only possible to say that, of the information which has been reviewed and analysed to date, nothing suggests that a change is warranted in the IAEA's conclusion that Iraq's nuclear weapons programme has been, for all practical purposes, destroyed, removed or rendered harmless.

14. However, it is clear even at this stage that Iraq's crash programme to extract weapons-grade material from safeguarded reactor fuel constitutes an additional violation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Equally, Iraq's failure until now to declare this crash programme and other weapons-related activities and to turn over to the IAEA all nuclear-related documents and materials clearly constitute violations of Iraq's obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PLAN

A. INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

15. As a consequence of the events described in paragraphs 5-14 above, an ad hoc inspection mission - IAEA-28 - of IAEA inspectors, assisted by experts in centrifuge and weapon technologies provided by Member States, was sent to Iraq from 9 to 19 September 1995 to follow up on the new information received by the IAEA. A detailed report on IAEA-28 is being prepared and will be transmitted to the Council as soon as possible. However, the following provides highlights of the IAEA-28 mission's findings:

a. For the first time, it was acknowledged by Iraq that the activities carried out at first at Tuwaitha and later at Al Atheer had been aimed at the production of a nuclear device and not only to the definition of what was required to produce it, as had previously been asserted by Iraq. Key documentation on Iraq's design of a nuclear device was provided to the IAEA.

b. The involvement of the Al Qa Qaa State Establishment in support of the development of the implosion package was for the first time acknowledged by Iraq, and declared to have begun in 1987.

c. The crash programme which was initiated in the late summer of 1990 had been planned to comprise the chemical processing of both unirradiated and irradiated research reactor fuel to recover the highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the fuel; the re-enrichment of part of the HEU through the use of a 50-machine centrifuge cascade which was to have been specially constructed for the purpose; the conversion of the HEU chemical compounds to metal. Had the HEU recovery and enrichment process been successful, it could have resulted in the availability by the end of 1991 of a quantity of HEU sufficient to manufacture a single low-yield nuclear device.

d. Also planned were measures such as the fabrication of the implcsion package and the selection and construction of a test site and studies of a delivery system. Assembly of the device could not have been possible, according to the estimate of the Iraqis scientists, before the end of 1992. The validity of this estimate

was one of the issues addressed during IAEA-28 and is currently under assessment by the IAEA with the assistance of nuclear weapons experts.

e. Detailed explanations were provided by Iraqi authorities of centrifuge related activities in the buildings of the Engineering Design Centre (Rashdiya), but no convincing rationale was offered for Iraq's continued concealment, even after the commencement in July 1993 of the high-level technical talks, of the role played by the Engineering Design Centre in the covert nuclear programme.

f. No evidence has as of yet been found of practical progress towards the establishment of the 50-machine centrifuge enrichment cascade, although it appears that external assistance was to have been relied upon for the procurement and production of the carbon fibre cylinder components of the centrifuge rotors.

g. Wide ranging information was obtained which provided clarification and confirmation of various aspects of the procurement network established to support the centrifuge enrichment project.

h. In spite of the obvious progress in openness and transparency shown by a number of Iraqi staff participating in the technical discussions, there is still a tendency to misrepresent the expertise and competence of Iraqi scientists and engineers both in the areas of programme co-ordination and in some specific R & D activities.

i. Initial indications do not appear to conflict with the IAEA's assessment of the scope and status of Iraq's clandestine programme to acquire nuclear weapon capability, as set out in the IAEA's seventh semi-annual report. However, it would be premature to draw any definitive conclusions pending analysis of the recently acquired documentation, samples and other information.

B. ONGOING MONITORING AND VERIFICATION

16. Events described in paragraphs 5-14 above, although commanding a shift in priority of other activities, did not detract from the full implementation of the IAEA Plan. In the period under review, resident inspectors of the Nuclear Monitoring Group (NMG) have continued their work in the field according to schedule, with the support of the staff of the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre (BMVC) and in coordination with the chemical, biological and missiles groups of the Special Commission. 105 inspections - most of these unannounced - have been conducted at some 51 sites/facilities, 11 of which were visited for the first time.

17. The sixth radiometric survey of Iraq's main water bodies was completed in April 1995. Samples of water, sediment and biota were taken at 15 sites selected from the 52 locations for which baseline data had been established in the original survey completed in November 1992. Twelve additional locations along the Euphrates watercourse, close to the Al Qaim phosphate fertiliser plant were sampled. The Al Qaim phosphate plant was the facility where large quantities of uranium were extracted from uranium bearing Iraqi phosphate ores originating from Iraq's mine at Akashat. The uranium extraction and concentration plant was totally destroyed during the war. The analysis of water and sediment samples taken along the river in the proximity of the Al Qaim works will be used to determine the practical capability to detect a facility of this kind and verify how far downstream signatures from the plant persist. It will also provide a baseline against

which future analyses at this specific site will be compared to verify the absence of uranium activity associated with phosphate fertiliser production.

18. The level of practical cooperation by Iraqi counterparts in facilitating and expediting IAEA's field work continues to be high.

C. PROVISION OF INFORMATION BY IRAQ

19. The reporting requirements stipulated in paragraph 22 and Annex 2 of the Plan are being fulfilled regularly at six-month intervals by the Iraqi authorities.

20. In July the semi-annual update was provided on facilities, installations and sites where nuclear activities of any kind have been carried out or which in IAEA's judgement could be suitable to host nuclear activities. The update is also required to include sites and facilities where material and equipment identified in the Annex 3 of the IAEA's Plan are located. In their July report the Iraqi authorities provided detailed information on 29 additional facilities bringing the total number of sites declared by Iraq under paragraph 22 of the Plan to 169. The large number of documents provided by Iraq on 20 August 1995 may contain information on hitherto undeclared sites and facilities which had been connected with the covert nuclear programme. In this case, Iraq will have to submit detailed information and the IAEA will decide if the inclusion of these sites or facilities in the monitoring regime is warranted.

D. RELEASE, RELOCATION AND CHANGE OF THE USE OF EQUIPMENT, MATERIALS AND FACILITIES

21. Through the channel of the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) the IAEA receives requests for the release of - or for the permission to relocate - equipment and materials, as well as requests for permission to change the use of monitored buildings. All NMD requests are processed in consultation with the Special Commission. Since the start of the implementation of the IAEA Plan (August 1994) some 20 such requests have been received and, in the period under review, 12 have been approved. Items for which release, relocation or change of use is approved remain subject to ongoing monitoring and verification at a frequency commensurate with their significance.

IV. SUMMARY

22. The IAEA Plan for monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions continues to be implemented by resident inspectors of the Nuclear Monitoring Group with the assistance of, and in full coordination with, the Special Commission. During the period under review the Nuclear Monitoring Group conducted 105 inspections at some 51 facilities, 11 facilities of which were not previously inspected.

23. Shortly after the arrival in Jordan of General Hussein Kamel, the former Minister of Industry and Military Industrialisation, an IAEA delegation was invited to Baghdad to receive information on the past Iraqi covert nuclear programme, allegedly withheld at the instruction of General Hussein Kamel. Following this invitation a series of technical meetings were held in Baghdad with the Iraqi authorities from 17 to 20 August 1995 and information and supporting documents were given by the Iraqi authorities to the IAEA delegation. The most important information

concerned the progress made in Iraq in their covert nuclear programme during the period immediately preceding the Gulf War, i.e. from June 1990 to the outbreak of the conflict (17 January 1991).

24. According to Iraqi officials a crash programme was launched in September 1990 to extract and further enrich the enriched uranium contained in the safeguarded research reactor fuel at the Tuwaitha site and to use the weapon-grade material resulting form this crash programme to accelerate the development of a nuclear device. Had this programme been completed, it could have provided enough material for a nuclear device in a shorter time than would have been necessary under Iraq's covert programme to enrich natural uranium. As it turned out, the chemical operations to extract the enriched uranium from the research reactor fuel was never begun since the equipment assembled to implement the programme was destroyed by coalition air raids in the first days of the war. All of the safeguarded research reactor fuel was accounted for by the inspectors of the IAEA-1 in May 1991.

25. Information was also provided by Iraq along with supporting documents on the progress made in the same time period by the weaponization team in Al Atheer. Assessment of the documents is underway.

26. On 20 August prior to the departure of the IAEA delegation from Baghdad, Iraqi authorities announced the discovery of thousands of documents and several tons of metals and other materials on a farm said to be owned by the family of General Hussein Kamel. The documents and materials were removed to the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre where, in the course of three following weeks, a joint IAEA\UNSCOM team completed a preliminary scanning of all documents, sorting them according to their subject into four categories - nuclear, biological, chemical, and missiles. After this preliminary inventory the nuclear related documents were removed to IAEA Headquarters in Vienna for review and analysis. At the same time, samples of metals and other material were taken and their analysis is underway.

27. Following talks in Baghdad, the IAEA team met in Jordan with General Hussein Kamel. His statements on Iraq's past nuclear weapons programme provided useful information.

28. A follow up inspection mission - IAEA-28 - took place from 9 to 19 September 1995 with the participation of experts in centrifuge and weapons-related technologies provided by Member States. The report of this inspection is in preparation.

29. Clearly, given the sheer magnitude of the documentation provided in August by Iraq it would be premature at this stage to draw conclusions as to their detailed content and implications. There is no certainty, of course that all nuclear relevant documents have been delivered even now.

30. What is clear at this stage is that Iraq's crash programme to extract weapons-grade material from the safeguarded reactor fuel constitutes an additional violation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and Iraq's failure, until now, to declare this programme and other weapons-related activities and to turn over to the IAEA all nuclear-related documents and materials constitutes a violation of Iraq's obligations under the relevant Security Council resolutions.